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Magnitude  Estimation: An  Application  to
Farmers' Risk-Income  Preferences
George  F.  Patrick, Brian F.  Blake  and
Suzanne  H.  Whittaker
Magnitude  estimation,  a  technique  developed  by  psychology  for  obtaining  ratio
scaled values,  was used to derive risk-income  preferences  of ninety-one  central Indiana
farmers.  Both variability-income  and bankruptcy-income  measures were developed  and
related to farmers'  socio-economic  attributes.  Wealth and education had limited effects
compared  with  off-farm  employment,  percent  debt  and  expected  levels  of income,
percent debt and net worth growth.  Magnitude  estimation provided reliable  estimates of
preferences.  Farmers  gave  greater  importance  to  the bankruptcy-income  measure  of
risk-income  preferences, but only a small portion of the variation of either measure could
be explained.
Agricultural  economists  have  been  inter-
ested  in  farmers'  risk-income  preferences
and  effects  of these preferences  on decision-
making  for  many  years.  However,  as  indi-
cated  by  Roumasett,  there  is  no  consensus
regarding how to define  risk or measure  risk
preferences.  Risk  has  sometimes  been
viewed as the variance  or another measure  of
dispersion  of  possible  outcomes. 1 Alterna-
tively,  risk has been viewed in a "safety  first"
context  as the chance  of loss or possibility of
disaster.  Furthermore,  as  reviewed  by
Young,  there has been a considerable  discus-
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sion of difficulties  associated with alternative
methods of measuring risk preferences.  Only
a limited  number  of studies  have  estimated
farmers'  risk  preferences  and  even  fewer
studies  have  focused  on  relationships  be-
tween  farmers' attributes and their risk pref-
erences. 2 Close  association  of farmers'  attri-
butes  and risk-income  preferences  could  fa-
cilitate  utilization  of risk-income  preference
information  in farm  management  extension,
microeconomic  policy,  and  other  applica-
tions.
This study  utilizes  an  easily applied  alter-
native  measurement  technique,  magnitude
estimation  [Stevens],  to  develp  risk-income
indices  which  are  then  related  to  various
farmer attributes.  Both the variability of pos-
sible outcomes and possibility of disaster con-
cepts  of  risk  are  considered  in  a  multiple
goals  context.  Alternative  methods  of  es-
timating risk attitudes are briefly reviewed in
the first section of this paper,  but emphasis  is
given  to the  farmers'  attributes  used  to ex-
plain  these  risk  preferences.  Second,  the
2Lin,  Dean  and  Moore  found  that  Bernoullian  utility
functions provided greater  accuracy  in predicting  crop
patterns than the lexicographic and profit maximization
formulations  but  did not  relate farmers'  attributes  to
their risk preferences.
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theory behind magnitude  estimation and the
procedures  used in  this study are described.
Based  on  the  studies  reviewed  in  the  first
section,  a model relating farmers'  attributes
and  risk-income  preferences  is  developed
and the results obtained are presented in the
third  section.  Implications  of the  study  are
discussed in the final  session.
Measuring  Risk-Income  Preferences
Various  techniques  based on the expected
utililty framework  have  been  used  to  elicit
utility functions  [Dillon],  but there has been
considerable discussion of the merits of these
technique  [Young].  The  utility  functions
elicited do not permit interpersonal compari-
sons  concerning  risk  attitudes.  However,
Pratt  developed  a  measure  of risk  aversion
which  is  defined  for  a  specified  money
amount  and  allows  interpersonal  compari-
sons  of risk  attitudes  because  it is  indepen-
dent  of  the  scale  and  origin  of  the  utility
function.
Halter and Mason used a modified-Ramsey
technique  to elicit utility functions and com-
pute Pratt coefficients  for 44  Oregon farmers
in  1974.  Eleven farm and operator character-
istics  were  analyzed  in  regression  analyses
with  the Pratt  coefficients  as  the  dependent
variable.  Percent  of land  owned,  education,
and age were statistically significant in linear
form.  Education  squared  and the  education-
percent  ownership  and  education-age  in-
teraction factors also were related to the Pratt
coefficients.  Whittaker  and Winter reported
on  a follow-up  study in which similar elicita-
tion procedures were used for the same farm-
ers in  1976.  In their analysis,  they found that
the  signs  for  all  the  estimated  regression
coefficients  were  reversed  from  those  ob-
tained  in  1974.  They  suggest  a  variety  of
possible  causes  of the  differences  in the  re-
sults  obtained,  including  unreliability  of
point  risk  measures  and  hypotheses  to  be
tested.
Dillon and Scandizzo utilized age, income,
household  size,  and  ethical  attitude  toward
betting to predict risk attitudes of a sample  of
land  owners  and  tenants  in  Northeastern
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Brazil.  Both  tenure  groups  were  more  risk
adverse  when  subsistence  was  at  risk  than
when  it  was  not.  Ethical  beliefs  against
gambling and age were associated with great-
er risk aversion for both groups.  Increases  in
income  predicted  a decrease  in risk aversion
while household  size had mixed effects. They
concluded that most, but not all, peasants are
risk  averse  and  that  the  distribution  of risk
attitudes  is  not  well  represented  by  the
mean.
Binswanger  developed  an  "experimental"
method  which  involved  interviews  over  an
extended period  and the use  of actual finan-
cial  compensation  at  realistic  levels.  The
gamble  chosen  by the  respondent  indicated
the level  of risk aversion.  Risk aversion tend-
ed  to  increase  as  the  stakes  of  the  game
increased,  and  all but one of 118  individuals
were  risk  averse.  Binswanger  attempted  to
predict differences  in attitudes toward risk in
terms  of age,  schooling,  assets,  land rented,
salaried employment,  working age adults per
family,  progressiveness,  net transfers,  luck in
previous  games,  and attitude  toward  gambl-
ing.  Although  only  a small  portion,  5  to  21
percent,  of the variation  in the risk aversion
coefficients  was  explained,  in  most instances
schooling  and good luck in prior games were
associated with risk aversion.  Wealth and the
other variables  had only  limited impacts  on
risk aversion.
Grisley  and Kellogg used  the  Binswanger
procedure  for  40  Thai  farmers.  They  found
that  farmers  initially  exhibited  decreasing
risk  aversion,  then  increasing,  and  finally
decreasing  risk  aversion  as  the  stakes  in-
creased.  This  did not support their hypothe-
sis that the decision makers were risk adverse
and would have increasing risk aversion over
the games  considered.  They  also found  that
land owners,  larger farmers,  and older farm-
ers were  not  less  risk  adverse  than renters,
smaller  farmers,  and  younger  farmers  as  is
commonly  hypothesized.
Moscardi and de Janvry developed an indi-
rect  measure  of  risk  preference  based  on
observed  economic  behavior which  was  the
dependent  variable  in  a  regression  analysis
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with  a number of socio-economic  and struc-
tural characteristics  for  45  Mexican families.
Seven  variables  explained  37  percent  of the
variation.  Off-farm  income,  extent  of  land
under control,  and membership in a solidari-
ty group  were  all negatively  associated  with
risk aversion.  Family size,  schooling,  and age
were not statistically  significant.
These studies have used different concepts
of risk aversion and techniques for estimating
farmers'  risk attitudes,  but all  have  encoun-
tered  difficulties.3 Direct  elicitation  proce-
dures  have  produced  inconsistent  results
with  respect  to  risk  attitudes.  Binswanger
also  found  the  Dillon-Scandizzo  interview
technique  to  be  unreliable  and  misleading.
Very substantial  costs  are involved  in  apply-
ing  the  experimental  method.  Knowles  has
criticized the experimental  approach, such as
used by Binswanger and by Grisley  and Kel-
logg,  on  the basis  that it does  not avoid  the
utility of gambling problems.
Additional  criticisms  of the  experimental
approach are that farmers received  money to
play with  and may have viewed this  as "fun-
ny"  money  and  although  actual  choices  are
observed, the circumstances  are artificial and
the  subject  needs  a  considerable  learning
period.  The observed  economic behavior ap-
proach  used by  Moscardi  and de Janvry  re-
quires  rather  restrictive  assumptions  to
specify  the  component  attributable  to  risk
aversion.
Difficulties have also been  encountered in
determining factors  associated with risk pref-
erences.  Although  similar  variables  have
been used in the various  studies,  the  results
have not been entirely consistent.  Some vari-
ables  have  had  the  expected  sign  and  have
3Although  not  concerned  with  risk-attitudes  directly,
Harman  et al. found  that age,  education,  asset  level,
acres  of cropland,  and proportion  of cropland  owned
was  associated with the importance  of the  goal "avoid
being  forced  out of business."  Acres  of land,  owned
land, proportion  of land owned,  net worth,  debt-asset
rates,  asset  level,  number  of dependents,  age,  and
tenure  could  predict  "avoid  years  of low  profits  or
losses."  The R
2s of the regression  equations were  .189
and  .413,  respectively.
been statistically  significant  in some  studies,
but not in others. In most cases, substantially
less  than  one-half  of  the  variability  in  risk
aversion  has been associated  with the factors
considered.
Several factors  may  contribute  to  the  dif-
ficulties  of  measuring  risk-income  prefer-
ences  and the socio-economic  characteristics
associated with them.  Young and Musser,  as
well as psychological  reviews  such as [Slovic,
et al.,] have  suggested  that measures  of risk
preference  differ  over  time  and  situations.
Some, but not all,  of this variation represents
unreliability.4 It is  not  clear  to what  extent
the low coefficients  of determination found in
predicting  risk-income  preferences  from
socio-economic  characteristics  result  from
unreliability of the measure rather than inde-
pendence  of the  variables.  Previous  empiri-
cal  studies  have  generally  not  been  con-
cerned with reliability of the measures  used.
Second, many of the studies have considered
only a limited number of farmers.  Variability
of results from study to  study may reflect the
small samples  used.
Finally,  the studies may represent  the ap-
plication of an inappropriate  explanatory sys-
tem.  Typically,  analyses  regressing  risk pref-
erences  and  farmers'  socio-economic  charac-
teristics  are  couched  in  causal terms.  These
analyses  attempt  to  identify  those  socio-
economic  characteristics  which  "increase,"
"decrease,"  "lead  to,."  or  "determine"  risk
preferences.  Low  coefficients  of  determi-
nation are  seen  as failures  to  identify  factors
which "cause" differences  among individuals.
However,  should  the  R2s  be  high?  Many
variables,  such  as the information processing
style  of the  decisionmaker  or  knowledge  of
alternatives,  may  intervene  between  the
socio-economic  characteristics  of  a  farmer
and his risk preferences.  It is these interven-
ing  factors  which  current  theories  of  deci-
sion-making  postulate  as  "causes."  Socio-
economic characteristics  may serve as proxies
4Unreliability  is the percentage  of total variance  that  is
estimated to be random variation.  Cook and Campbell
provide  an overview  of the unreliability  effects.
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for some  of these  intervening  variables,  but
other intervening variables  may,  at best,  be
only  indirectly  related  to these  characteris-
tics.  It may be more theoretically  justifiable
to  view  the  relationships  between  socio-
economic  characteristics  as  descriptive  anal-
yses indicating the concentration  of risk pref-
erences  within  a  socio-economic  category
rather  than  as  a  strictly  causal  analysis. 5 In
this case,  assuming adequate sample size and
reliable  measures,  the low  coefficients of de-
termination  imply  that  risk-income  prefer-
ences  are  distributed  across  groups  rather
than concentrated  within particular  types.
Study Procedures
The risk-income  preferences  of individual
farmers  are  measured  in this  study by  mag-
nitude  estimation  (ME)  procedures.  ME  is
one  of  a  class  of  "ratio  scaling"  techniques
[Hamblin,  Stevens]  in  which  an  individual
judges the magnitude  or intensity  of a given
item as a ratio of another item as the base.  In
this study,  a base  goal is  assigned  a value of
100.  The respondent is asked to assign points
to each  of the other  goals  so that the  scores
reflect the importance  of each goal relative to
the base goal.  For example,  if a farmer thinks
goal  B is twice  as important  as the base goal,
then  he  would  give  200  points  to  goal  B.
However,  if goal B is only half as important as
the base  goal,  the farmer would  assign  only
50 points to goal B.  Any number of points can
be given to a goal as long as the score reflects
the  importance  of that  goal  relative  to  the
base  goal.
An  estimate  of reliability  can  be  obtained
by varying the base goal used for comparison
[Nunnally].  For  example,  suppose  a farmer
thinks that goal X is worth 200 in importance
when  compared  with  Y,  the  base  goal  as-
signed  100  points.  This  farmer  should  then
judge Y to be worth 50 if goal X is  made the
base  goal  and  assigned  100  points.  The  de-
gree  that  identical  ratios  of  goals  are  not
5For a discussion  of the difficulties  involved in postulat-
ing  a causal  relationship  with unspecified  intervening
processes  see  Cook and Campbell.
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repeated  with  alternative  base  goals  repre-
sents alternative  form or equivalence reliabil-
ity.  Conversely,  the  proportion  of variance
unique  to a  given base  goal is  typically con-
sidered  to be the proportion of random error
contained  in that measure.
The  ME  procedure  has  several  potential
advantages  for  measuring  farmers'  goals.
First,  it  is  a  well  documented  procedure
which has been found to yield reliable results
in  a variety  of contexts.  For example,  it has
been used to determine  the subjective  value
of  money  [Stevens],  wages  [Hamblin],
seiousness  of  crime  [Sellin  and  Wolfgang],
national power [Shinn],  degree  of affinity  for
various  animals  [Carpenter  and  Blackman],
as  well  as  the  more  usual  psychophysical
phenomena.  The  psychophysical  theory
underlying  the  technique  is  outlined  by
Hamblin  and by Torgenson and critically  ex-
amined  by  Ross.  Second,  ME  is  realtively
simple  to  apply.  Individuals  are  required  to
assign  numbers to  goal  statements which re-
flect the goal's importance,  relative to a base
goal,  for the individual.
Finally,  ME scores  for farmers who gener-
ate  reliable  ratio  scaled  judgements  should
be comparable  across  individuals and permit
scalar  transformations.  Rating  scales  and
Thurstone  scaling  procedures  traditionally
used  to  measure  farmers'  preferences  yield
an  "interval"  scale  with  an  arbitrary  origin
and fixed intervals separating the scale points
on  the underlying  continuum.  According  to
Stevens, the scale numbers,  X,  of an interval
scale can be transformed to a set of numbers,
X',  following the rule:
X'  =  aX  +  b (a >  0)
Differences  among  individuals  in  the  origin
and scale separations  can hinder aggregation
of scores across individuals  and interpersonal
comparisons  of  preferences.  "Ratio"  scales,
in contrast,  are invariant  only with respect to
transformation  of the form:
X'  =  cX  (c  > 0)
As  demonstrated  by Torgenson  and  Ross,
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ratios  among  scores  are  independent  of the
origin and size of the (equal) intervals  among
scale  points.  Therefore,  by establishing  the
same baseline  for all individuals  and  scoring
all  items  in  terms  of  multiples  of  that
baseline,  comparisons  of scores  among  indi-
viduals  can  be  made. 6 For  example,  two
farmers  may  be  comparable  in  that  goal  X
may be twice  as important as  goal Y for both
of them.  This 2:1  ratio should be comparable
- even  though  a given goal  is  more impor-
tant to  one  farmer  than  the  other when  the
goals  are  considered  separately.  This  is  also
true if one farmer's subjective  scale of impor-
tance has more divisions or intervals than the
other  representing  the  fact that  one  farmer
discriminates  more  finely  among  goals  than
does the other.
A  sample  of  91  farmers  drawn  randomly
from  a list of agricultural  producers  in three
Central Indiana counties were interviewed  in
this  study.  Information  was  obtained  about
the current family and farm  situation.  Farm-
ers were also asked about their desired future
income  for  consumption,  expected  percent
net  worth  growth,  and  anticipated  percent
debt in three years.  For a further discussion
of the sample and data collection procedures,
see  Patrick,  Whitaker  and Blake.
The  farmers  assigned  points  to  each  of
eight  goals;  this  procedure  was  repeated
three  times using  a different  statement from
the goal  set as  the base  goal in  each trial.  In
the first trial, the base goal statement was  "a
farm business that produces  a stable year-to-
year income"  (stable income).  In subsequent
trials  the  base  goals  were  "to  avoid  being
unable  to meet  loan payments  and/or  avoid
foreclosure  on  my  mortgage"  (bankruptcy)
and  "to  be recognized  as a top farmer  in my
community"  (recognition).  The  income  goal
included in the goal set was stated "to attain a
desirable  level  of family living."
Spearman-rho correlations were calculated
to  check  (1) the respondents'  scoring  consis-
6These  ratios can be used in  goal programming  models
(Patrick and Blake) to quantify trade-offs among multi-
ple goals.
tency  among  trials  and  (2)  the  effect  of the
base  statements  on the rank  ordering of the
goals.  The median correlation  for the sample
between  the  trials  using  base  1 (stable  in-
come)  and 2 (bankruptcy)  was  .637;  between
1 and  3  (recognition),  .651;  and  between  2
and 3,  .720. These  results indicate that farm-
ers  could  rank  goals  more  consistently  with
bases  2  and  3.  Therefore,  the  ME  base  1
results  were  not  used  in  further  analyses. 7
Nine farmers with Spearman-rho  coefficients
of  .4  or  less  with  bases  2  and  3  were
eliminated on the basis of inconsistency.8
Two  measures  of risk-income  preferences
were  developed  using  the  ME  procedure.
The  first,  a  stability-income  measure,  is the
average of the base 2 and 3 points assigned to
the goal  "a farm  business  which produces  a
stable income" when "attain a desirable level
of  family  living"  is  indexed  to  equal  100
points. 9 The  second,  a  bankruptcy-income
measure,  is the average  of points  assigned to
the  goal  "avoid  being  unable  to  meet  loan
payments  and/or  avoid  foreclosure  on  my
mortgage"  when  desirable  income  is the in-
dex.  The  stability-income  measure  can  be
interpreted  as  approximating  the  variability
of possible outcomes concept of risk,  and the
bankruptcy-income  measure  is  in the  safety-
first context.  Higher values  on each measure
indicate  greater  risk  aversion.  The  mean
7The  differences  in  medians  between  trials  involving
base  1 were  significantly  lower  than the base  2 and 3
trial at  the 5 percent  level.  The bankruptcy  and rec-
ognization goals represent the highest and lowest rank-
ed goals respectively  for most farmers.  These farmers
may have found it easier to assign values to other goals
with the  base being at either extreme.  Carpenter and
Blackwood  have  found  that  the order  of items  has a
small but significant effect  in some cases.  In this exper-
iment,  part  of the  difficulty  with the results obtained
on the first trial may be due to the interviewee's lack of
familiarity  with the technique.
8A total of 21 farmers had Spearman-rho  coefficients  of
.4 or less in comparison  with base 1.
9Because of the ratio properties of the data, transforma-
tions can  be  performed  to  index  any  of the  goals  as
equal to 100.
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value  of  the  stability-income  measure  was
110.4,  significantly  less than the  142.9 mean
of the bankruptcy-income  measure. The sim-
ple  linear correlation  between  the two  mea-
sure was  .355.
Empirical  Results
The  risk-income  preferences  of  farmers
were  hypothesized  to  vary with  characteris-
tics  of the operator,  family,  and farm  as well
as  target levels  of various  goals. 10 Based  on
previous  studies,  older  farmers,  those  with
dependent  children  and  larger  percentages
of debt to total assets are expected to be more
risk  averse.  Education  and  factors  repre-
senting wealth  are  expected to be related to
lower  levels  of  risk  aversion.  The  implica-
tions  on  risk  aversion  of holding  an off-farm
job and the three-year target levels for future
income  for  family  living,  percent  debt,  and
percent  net  worth  growth  are  less  clear. ll
Farmers  with  off-farm  income  may  be  less
risk averse because  of the  security  provided
by  this  income  while  individuals  who  are
highly risk  averse  may seek off-farm  jobs for
security.  Individuals  with  high  target  levels
for  income  and  net  worth  may  be  less  risk
averse  than  individuals  with  lower  target
levels.  Higher  planned  percent  debt  may
indicate  less  risk aversion or the  individual's
knowledge  that  borrowing  is  necessary  to
achieve  other goals.
The estimated coefficients  and t values  for
the  stability-income  and bankruptcy-income
equations  in linear form with 77 observations
are presented in Table 1. Positive coefficients
"There  is  likely  to be  some  interaction  between  risk-
income  preferences  and target  levels of various  goals,
but these interactions  are not considered in this study.
The  correlations  between  the independent  variables
did not exceed  .48.  The correlation  for planned future
income available for family living and planned percent
debt was  -. 41,  for net worth and planned percent  net
worth  growth  was  -. 08,  and  for  percent  debt  and
planned percent debt was  .36.
lAlthough not specified in the questionnaire,  comments
by  the  farmers  indicated  they were  specifying  target
levels in  nominal  terms.
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indicate  greater  risk aversion  as  the variable
increases.  Similar  to  studies  previously  re-
viewed,  the  attributes  considered  in  this
analysis explain less than one-half of the total
variation  in risk-income preferences,  and the
overall  stability-income  equation  is just sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level.  A number of
variables  have coefficients  which are statisti-
cally  significant  at  the  ten  percent  level  or
higher and have the same  sign in both equa-
tions.  Tillable  acres,  net worth,  presence  of
livestock,  and average gross farm income had
t  values  of  less  than  .3  in  a  preliminary
version  of the equations  and were  excluded
from further  analysis.
Moscardi  and de  Janvry,  as well as  Dillon
and Scandizzo,  found that older farmers were
more  risk  averse.  In  the  stability-income
equation,  the age  variable had  the expected
positive  sign,  but the t value was  extremely
low.  However  in  the  bankruptcy-income
equation,  age  was  negative  and  significant.
Many of the older farmers had very few or no
debts,  and the  possibility  of repayment  dif-
ficulties  or  bankruptcy  may  have  been
viewed  as  very  remote  and  assigned  a  low
value.  In  contrast,  many  younger  farmers
had  substantial  debts  or  were  considering
borrowing  additional  money  in  the  future
and possibilities  of financial  difficulties  were
of concern.
Education was included through two dum-
my variables,  one was for technical education
after  high  school  or  some  college,  and  the
second for  completion  of college.  Both  vari-
ables  were  positive  in  the  stability-income
equation  indicating  greater  risk  aversion  by
more educated farmers.  This was contrary to
the  relationship  expected  based  on  other
studies,  but  neither  coefficient  was  signifi-
cant.  In  the  bankruptcy-income  equation,
college  education had the expected  negative
sign, but was less than one-half the size of the
standard error. 12
2An alternative formulation with education coded a 1 for
high  school,  2  for  some  college  or vocational  school,
and 3 for college graduation resulted in positive  coeffi-
cients in both equations which were smaller than their
standard errors.
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TABLE 1.  Estimated  Coefficients of Risk-Income  Equations,  Central  Indiana  Farmers,  1979.a
(n  =  77)
Variable  Stability-Income  Bankruptcy-Income
Age (years)  0.1180  -1.6638
(0.2379)  (1.9553)
Technical  educationb  7.8791  0.7300
(0.7401)  (0.0400)
College educationc  21.8448  -11.7801
(1.5180)  (0.4773)
Children  under  1 8d  -23.2410  -40.6141
(1.7246)  (1.7561)
Percent debt  0.0655  1.775
(0.3554)  (3.7237)
Off-farm  jobe  -15.8244  - 30.8419
(1.6638)  (1.8895)
Planned future income  - 0.3212  - 0.9558
($1,000)  (0.9503)  (1.6476)
Planned  percent  debt  0.3243  0.2128
(1.7401)  (0.6652)
Planned  net worth  growth  0.2426  0.6469
(percent over 3 years)  (1.6728)  (2.5990)
Constant  101.7751  217.0740
(10.3260)  (3.9935)
R 2 0.2047  0.4097
F  1.9155  5.1657
a"t"  values are  indicated in parentheses.
bTechnical  education  is coded  as  1 for  technical  training  beyond  high  school  or some  college  and  0 for  no
additional training.
CCollege  education  is coded  as 1 if college was completed  and 0 otherwise.
dChildren  under  18 is coded  as 1 if there are children under  18 years of age in  the household and 0 otherwise.
eOff-farm job is coded as  1 if the farm  operator or spouse has  an off-farm job and 0 otherwise.
The presence of children under 18 years of
age  in  the  household  was  associated  with
lower  levels  of risk  aversion  in  both  equa-
tions.  It  was  hypothesized  that  households
with dependent children would  be more risk
averse than households without children, but
this  was  not  supported  by  the  results.  The
intercorrelation  between  age  and  children
under  18  was  -. 47,  but  the  coefficients
changed  only  slightly with  alternative model
specifications.
Although  the  percent  debt  had  only  a
limited  relationship  to  risk  aversion  in  the
stability-income  equation,  it was  highly  sig-
nificant  in the bankruptcy  income  equation.
A lower level  of risk aversion was  associated
with  farmers  with  a  higher  percentage  of
debt.
If either the farmer  or spouse  had an  off-
farm job, then the stability-income  and bank-
ruptcy-income  measures  were  both  signifi-
cantly reduced.  This  suggests  that operators
with  off-farm  income  were  less  risk  averse.
However,  the results can also be interpreted
as indicating that these operators give greater
emphasis to a desirable level of family living.
The higher the planned future income,  the
lower  the  apparent  risk  aversion  in  both
equations.  These  results  could  be  inter-
preted as  indicating  greater emphasis  on  in-
come for a desirable level of living,  but if one
expects  a higher income  in the future,  they
are likely to be less  concerned with risk.
Planned  percent  debt  and  percent  net
worth  growth  have  positive  coefficients  in
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both risk-income  equations.  The greater risk
aversion of the individuals  who are planning
faster  growth  appears  inconsistent  with  the
common view  that rapid growth  can  involve
greater  risk.  However,  these  individuals
could  be  placing  a  lower  importance  on  at-
taining  a  desirable  level  of family  living  in
order  to  achieve  higher  rates  of  net  worth
growth.
Implications
Risk-income  preferences  of farmers,  at
least  theoretically  comparable  across  indi-
viduals,  can be obtained through ME  proce-
dures.  The  Spearman-rho  correlations  indi-
cate that farmers assign values  to goals which
are consistent across different base goals. The
ME  procedure  is  easier to  use than  a mod-
ified-Ramsey  approach,  does not require the
detailed experimental  data used by Moscardi
and de Janvry,  or the extended interviews  of
the Binswanger's experimental  method.  Like
other interview methods, ME is based on the
farmer's  ability  and  willingness  to  describe
his  preferences  and  goals,  but the flexibility
of use and ease of application are advantages.
As  discussed by Patrick and Blake,  the ratios
derived through ME procedures  can be used
in goal programming models to specify trade-
offs  among alternative  goals.
The bankruptcy-income  index had a signif-
icantly higher value  than the stability-income
index  suggesting  farmers  may  give  greater
weight to the safety first context of risk.  The
R 2 of the  bankruptcy-income  descriptive
model  was  also  higher  than  the  stability-
income  model.  Although  the  statistical  sig-
nificance  of the  overall equations  differ,  the
signs  of  the  coefficients  are  generally  the
same  whether  the  variability  or  safety  first
concept  of risk  is  used.  The results  indicate
that risk aversion  does  not vary closely with
age  and education.  Both risk  aversion  mea-
sures increased with actual and planned  per-
cent  debt  and  with  planned  net  worth
growth.  Expected  levels  of  income,  net
worth  growth,  and  percent  debt  had major
roles in explaining risk-income preferences of
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farmers  and  should  be  included  in  future
studies.
This  study,  like  the  others  reviewed,  can
explain  less than  one-half of the variation  in
farmers'  risk attitudes.  Within  a descriptive
model,  these  coefficients  of determination
imply that specific levels of risk-income pref-
erences  are  not  highly  concentrated  within
subgroups of farmers on the basis of factors of
a priori interest.  Although  a number  of fac-
tors  considered  to  be  of  interest  were  in-
cluded  in  this  analysis,  risk-income  prefer-
ences were found to be more general in their
distribution.
Several reasons  suggest  that a descriptive
rather than causal model may be more appro-
priate  for  investigating  the  relationship  of
farmers'  risk-income  and  socio-economic
characteristics.  First,  as  discussed  previous-
ly, there  can  be conceptual  ambiguities  in a
causal  model  because  of  a  multiplicity  of
possible intervening processes.  Second,  a de-
scriptive  framework  can  avoid  the  logical
tautologies  inherent  in  many  analyses  con-
ducted within a causal framework.  For exam-
ple, does a specific socio-economic character-
istic (e.g.,  current debt load)  produce  a risk-
income  preference  or  does  a  risk-income
preference  result  in  a  farm  organization
which  produces  that  socio-economic  charac-
teristic? Finally,  a causal model may often be
unnecessary  to the objective  for which many
analyses  are  conducted.  Although  some  ap-
plications  do  require  causal  assumptions
[Patrick  and  Blake;  Baquet,  et  al.],  many
applications  in farm  management  extension,
development  program  planning,  and  aggre-
gate public policy require  only  a descriptive
framework.
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